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ABSTRACT

A study examined Carol Gilligan's theory of moral reasoning, seeking evidence to either support or deny the claim that individuals primarily use one of two different sets of sex-related constructs to arrive at decisions when faced with moral dilemmas. Subjects, 20 young lawyers and psychologists (equally divided as to men and women), were interviewed about how decisions were made in their workplace and then asked to describe a moral dilemma (defined as a situation in which they were not sure what was the right thing to do) that arose in the course of their work. The interviews were transcribed without any reference to the subject's sex and received a preliminary testing in sex identification. Interviews were then stratified by sex and occupation, distributed randomly and rated by three separate groups of raters with experience in questions of moral development. Findings suggest that the women subjects were seen as placing far more emphasis on an ethic of care rather than of justice. However, comparing the pattern of male mean scores with the pattern of female mean scores does not lead to the conclusion that Gilligan's theory has been supported by the data. Neither this study nor earlier studies have provided rigorous examination of the cognitive developmental aspects of the ethic of care within Gilligan's theory. (Tables of data and references are attached.) (NKA)

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GILLIGAN REVISITED: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF GENDER AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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Background

In 1986, a seminar at the national meeting of the Speech-Communication Association was devoted to "Feminist Theory and Cristicism in the Study of Communication." The seminar announcement points out that while research by and about women has increased greatly in the past decade, contributions from feminist theory haven't had a discernible impact on our discipline.

One reason for validity of this claim must be attributed to the distinction between research about women and feminist research. In the earliest days of new attention to "women's studies" and concern about women's representation as both subjects and conductors of research, research "on" women was an appropriate starting point. Too often, however, this resulted in comparing women to a male "norm" and understanding women only as they differed from men. By contrast, a feminist perspective would suggest that the prevailing paradigms (including assumptions, theory and method) demand scrutiny to understand the ways in which a patriarchal bias has limited our understanding of human interaction.

Further, a feminist perspective must incorporate attention to both women and men--by consideration of sex (based on biological distinctions between females and males) and gender (based on culturally-acquired distinctions between femininity and masculinity).

This paper seeks to investigate issues of sex, gender and methodology by extension of the work of Carol Gilligan. Her work has become widely known through publication of In a Different Voice in

1982. She claims that the predominant theories of moral development ignore, even devalue, women's different morality. This leads to a common experience of "not being heard" in the dominant society, which may cause women to question and mute their own "voice" as it expresses a different ethic of morality.

This book has sparked spirited debate about moral development and gender, as well as leading a new scrutiny of existing theories of moral development and their alleged gender bias. These issues are central to the communication discipline--understanding women's figurative "voice" must be part of the feminist scholarship on symbolic dimensions of human interaction.

The purpose of the research reported here is to examine the theory of moral reasoning advanced by Gilligan; to seek evidence that either supports or disconfirms the claim that individuals primarily use one of two different sets of constructs to arrive at decisions when faced with moral dilemmas, and that individual choice of construct is gender related.

Review of the Literature

Lawrence Kohlberg would be identified by most scholars of moral development theory as the "parent" of this theory and associated research. In the preface to The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Stages, he describes his work as "an effort to replicate Piaget's (1948) description of moral judgment stages, to extend them to adolescence, and to examine the relation of stage growth to opportunities to take the role of others in the social environment" (p. xix). This work led to revision of Piaget's two-stage model into six stages of moral judgment, culminating in his disseration in 1958, and a twenty-year longitudinal study to examine validity and sequence of these stages. Kohlberg's continued work and revision of both his theory and its application (see Kohlberg, 1984) and the work by a set of associated

scholars (Blatt, Rest, and Turiel among others) have led to an extensive body of research in this paradigm: a theory of moral development which assumes invariant stages of increasing complexity and maturity in moral reasoning.

Critics of Kohlberg's theory have charged its failure "to account for moral development in other cultures (Simpson, 1974), across the age span (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980), and its neglect of sex differences (Gilligan, 1977)." (Bussey and Maughan, 1982, p. 701). Indeed, Gilligan (1982) implies as a starting point for her research the recurring finding that women tend to "asymptote" at Stage 3, and men at Stage 4. Early work on women's moral development accepted this difference and Kohlberg's hypothesis that this is "due ot the limitations imposed on women's growth in our society...men play roles entailing more participation and responsibility, which stimulates their maturity" (Erickson, 1974b, p. 102) and sought intervention methods which would encourage women to develop reasoning at higher stages of moral development (see Erickson, 1974a, 1974b, 1975, and 1977a). Gilligan, however, attributes the recurring findings to gender bias in construction and application of the theory, a charge which has generated much reaction.

Walker (1986), in a critical review of sex differences in moral reasoning, points out that comparisons of women and men in moral reasoning is not a new issue--Freud (1927) "asserted that women lack moral maturity because of deficiencies in same-sex parental identification" and thus were morally inferior. Walker goes on to focus criticism of Kohlberg's work on the allegation that "a theorist might...define morality maturity in ways that inadvertently favor one sex or the other and thus create a false impression of real differences in moral maturity" (Walker, 1984, p. 677). He reviews and reanalyzes the research which has found significant sex differences, organized by age and development--childhood and early adolescence, late adolescence and youth, and adulthood.

Walker cites 13 studies examining sex differences in moral reasoning in adulthood, involving 1223 subjects between 21 and over 65 years of age, which yield four significant differences favoring men, or identifying men as a group at a higher stage of moral development than women. These include Haan et al (1976), Haan (1977), Holstein (1976), and Parikh (1980). He explains the differences as due to "sex...confounded with educational and/or occupational differences," and concludes that "sex differences in moral reasoning in adulthood are revealed only in a minority of studies, and even in those studies the differences tend to be small." (Walker, 1984, p. 688).

Gilligan disagrees with both Walker and Kohlberg, on the grounds that neither is responding to her contention that the issue is one of inadequate theory. Gilligan (1986) declares that Walker's criticism "completely misses my point," (Gilligan, 1986, p. 328) acknowledging that on two occasions her own work reported no sex differences using Kohlberg's scale. Further, she reports responses to Walker's work which criticize his use of statistics and challenge his findings: Haan (1985) uses the new scoring method and controls for social class and education yet finds significant sex differences, and Baumrind (1985) points out that higher levels of education correlate with lower scores for women in her sample.

We concur that much of the debate and discussion concerning Gilligan misses the point. It has curiously focused on a dualistic juxtaposition of Kohlberg and Gilligan: either Kohlberg is biased and Gilligan is right, or Kohlberg is not biased, so Gilligan is wrong. We would argue that there is a different and far more constructive approach to this debate.

Gilligan is one of many feminist scholars whose work has challenged existing theory and research. There is no question that the work of Kohlberg and his associates will benefit from the review and revisions Gilligan's criticisms have instigated, regardless of the outcomes. For example, Kohlberg (1983) acknowledges Gilligan's work as "broadening

the study of moral reasoning to what we see as aretaic judgments of personal worth and of special responsibilities for other person with whom one has particular ties, as well as possibly including ideals of the good life" (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 4). He clarifies the scope of his own theory as limited to one of three domains: deontic justice, and relabels his work "stages of justice reasoning." While we disagree with assignment of limited scope to Gilligan's work (as it seems premature given the status of research in this vein), we applaud the acknowledgement and review of Kohlberg's work and assume it will continue. At the same time, neither findings of significant sex or gender differences in Kohlberg and associates' research, nor consequent revisions in the conceptual framework or measurement systems of Kohlberg's theory validate or invalidate Gilligan's work.

Gilligan (1982) claims a quite different framework, literally a "re-vision" of moral development. She presents a "different voice" which both defines and resolves moral issues with an orientation that varies from the previously-defined as "best" use of abstract rules to derive "justice." Her work offers a challenge for further feminist scholarship, to explore ways in which prior theory and research have contributed to the muting of "women's voice."

Several paths are open for the next research steps to be taken. One is to extend Gilligan's work by examining applications and implications for other disciplines, a process which seems to be well underway (see Delworth and Seeman, 1985; Freeman, 1985; Davis, 1985; Rhodes, 1985; Reinhard, 1985; Wood, 1986; Kerber, 1986; Stack 1986). Another, equally important, path is to constructively use the methodological criticisms of Gilligan to spur further research and to investigate the validity of her claims by use of more rigorous and systematic research design. Both paths are necessary to move toward a more complete understanding of gender and moral development.

Design

The very nature of moral development does not easily lend itself to either operational definitions or traditional experimental manipulation. The purpose of this paper, to explore methodological issues concerning the study of moral development and gender, led to explicit decisions about the design of the study. Effort was made to increase the methodological rigor of Gilligan's study with blind ratings, while replicating as closely as possible the original interview protocol, and maintaining the integrity of the open-ended nature of the interviewee responses.

Two groups of young professionals, ten attorneys and ten psychologists with equivalent education and professional experience, served as subjects in this study. The sample included equal numbers of men and women, stratified by profession. These two professional occupations were chosen because they have characteristics inherently consistent with the two modes of moral reasoning defined by Gilligan: attorneys, whose work with clients is more likely to be centered around resolving conflicting rights, and psychologists, whose work is more likely to be centered around resolving conflicts in responsibilities and relationships.

Three additional methodological issues raised in the literature were considered that resulted in decisions about the study design. These issues were whether to use real-life or hypothetical dilemmas, whether mode of moral reasoning was a unidimensional or multidimensional construct, and whether the analysis could control for occupational and educational status.

The use of real life dilemmas. The use of real life dilemmas, instead of hypothetical stories to elicit responses to abstract dilemmas, was chosen for two reasons: first, to generate data that was consistent in form with Gilligan's; and second, to explore whether or not the stories told to us by the subjects would center on interpersonal conflicts. (We

explicitly excluded from the interviews dilemmas arising from conflicts with friends and families.) Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983) have stated that:

> Dilemmas located within a 'community' or 'family' context are likely to invoke caring and responses considerations; so to do... dilemmas of special obligation to friends and kin. In brief, choice of orientation seems to be primarily a function of setting and dilemmas and not sex. (p. 12)

Are the ethics of justice and care one bipolar dimension? In order to ensure that we could test whether subjects used primarily one orientation or whether both orientations might be emphasized at about the same levels, we elected to design two parallel scales. Lyons (1982) has reported results from a coding system that uses a dichotomous classification of mode of moral reasonong. Her approach assumed that the use of more of one mode of reasoning led to the use of less of the other. In this study, measuring both styles of reasoning separately permitted testing whether or not this assumption could be supported.

Do educational and occupational status confound moral development? Walker (1984) and Colby (1983) have suggested that when sex differences in moral reasoning stages have been reported, education and occupational status were not equivalent across males and females. The sample in this study, young clinical psychologists and attorneys (who have roughly equivalent degrees of advanced professional training), was chosen to control for these factors.

Data Collection Subjects were interviewed about how decisions were made in their workplace and then asked to describe a moral dilemma that arose in the course of their work. They were told that a moral dilemma was a situation in which they were not sure what was the right

thing to do. Each interview was tape recorded and transcribed with any cues to the subject's gender deleted.

Preliminary to rating, a test was run to ensure that the interviews could not be distinguished on the basis of the subject's gender. One page from each of four interviews (two male subjects and two female subjects) were rated by five men and five women as to the gender of the subjects. The raters failed to identify the gender of the subject more often than chance: the ratings were correct in identifying sex of interviewee only 48% of the time.

Copies of each interview were distributed randomly, stratified by gender and occupation, to three groups of raters: elementary and secondary teachers, professors of speech and communication with expertise in gender differences, and professors and advanced graduate students in psychology knowledgeable about the study of moral development. Each group consisted of twenty raters, equal in sex distribution. Every rater received four interviews, stratified by sex and profession of the subject. For each interview, the rater was asked to indicate, on four-point scales (where 1=virtually no emphasis to 4=a great deal of emphasis), the extent to which each mode of moral reasoning appeared to be present in the subject's telling of their moral dilemma. Every subject interview was rated twelve times.

The scale scores do not represent stages of moral reasoning, simply the extent to which the rater thought the mode of reasoning was emphasized. The description of these two modes, as provided to the raters, was adapted from Lyons (1983):

An Ethic of Care:

> The construction of a moral dilemma is described in terms of the conflicting responsibilities of actors in the dilemma. This conception of morality is based on the consideration of relationships as central to moral

decision making. The resolution of the dilemma is one that does least damage to those relationships and that least compromises the individual's responsibility to self and/or others. This approach has been described as one in which the actors are seen as members of a network of relationships of whose continuation they all depended. Morality is seen as arising from the experience of connection and conceived of as a problem of inclusion of the needs of all involved parties. The ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding that gives rise to compassion and care.

An Ethic of Justice:
The contruction of a moral dilemma is described in terms of the conflicting rights of actors in the dilemma. This conception of morality is based on the consideration of principles as central to moral decision making. The resolution of the dilemma is one that does least damage to the principles at stake and that least compromises the individual's rights and autonomy and/or the rights and autonomy of others. This approach has been described as one which each actor is seen as an autonomous individual. Thus, the means to the solution of a dilemma lies in independent, self-directed decision making on the part of the key actor. Morality is conceived of as a problem of balancing the claims of each autonomous actor. The ethic of rights rests on an understanding of fairness that gives rise to respect for independence and individual achievement.

Analysis. Ratings were tested for sex-specific differences in subjects' mode of reasoning by applying a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) permitting simultaneous examination of occupational choice (and by inference, education) as a possible confounding factor. It also

permitted examination of the interaction of subject occupation and sex as a determinant of the orientation moral reasoning.

The unit of observation used in the analysis in the subject of the interview. The dependent varibles are the mean rating scores of the two modes of moral reasoning for each interview. Each of the two scale scores for each interview were calculated by summing the twelve raters' scores and deriving the mean score for each scale. A somewhat less conservative approach would have been to use each rating as the unit of analysis, resulting in 240 observations, rather than only 20. This approach however woould be more sensitive to rater variance.

A secondary analysis was undertaken to test the possibility that sex or profession of the rater influenced the ratings. These two variables were entered as main effects and tested for differences in an ANOVA analysis. In both analyses, ratings on the two modes of rasoning were the dependent variable. Each rating was the unit of analysis, resulting in 240 observations.

Findings

Women were rated as using a framework of responsibility and caring at significantly higher levels than their male counterparts when describing how they resolved their dilemmas. The ethic of justice, however was used by men and women with about the same emphasis. Table 1 and 2 summarize the ANOVA analyses for ratings on both modes of reasoning. These findings are inconsistent with earlier studies where the investigators were not blind to the sex of the subjects. Instead, the findings present a picture that does not support the construct of sex-specific differences. Exploration of the distributions of the mean scores provides further evidence that the hypothesis does not withstand the test of sex-specific differences in this study.

First, if there are two equal but different styles or orientations of moral reasoning, as Gilligan argues, then one would expect to find data that correspond to sex-specific mirror images. Higher ratings on one reasonong style would lead to lower ratings on the alternative style. Our data lend little support for this notion. These data suggest that men and women are different, but they are different in non-corresponding [nonparallel] ways.

Second, when male and female mean scores are compared across mode of moral reasoning, male scores for both orientation were the same; that is, male subjects were not rated as favoring one mode of moral reasoning over another. Their mean score of 2.9 on both scales could be interpreted, using the anchor point descriptor, as placing "some emphasis" on both orientation of moral reasoning. In contrast, the ratings for female subjects had mean scores that differed significantly between the two orientations. Their average score for the ethic of care orientation was 3.35 and for the justice orientation, 2.61. Female subjects were identifies as showing clear preference for using an interpersonal framework to discuss the resolution of moral conflicts.

In addition to the ANOVA results, a set of findings subsequent to the methodological questions raised by other critics are reported here, but the implications will be saved for the discussion section. The findings are not the results of hypothesis tests but rather information that might be useful to future research seeking to discriminate between plausible evidence and methodological artifacts. Summarized briefly, these questions are about unidimensional type(s) of reasoning, real life or hypothetical dilemmas and whether or not occupation or education confound reported sex differences.

The use of two separate scales suggest, but do not firmly support, the likelihood that care and justice are not a single bi-modal construct. (An example of a construct that is bi-modal is masculinity and femininity.) Analysis of the distribution of responses showed that forty percent of the subjects were rated as having demonstrated roughly equal

emphasis on both styles. If the two distributions had strongly favored a unidemensional construct, then the ratings on the separate scales would appear, when collapsed, as one bimodal distribution. An array of these data as described here would not produce such a result.

The non-significant interaction between sex and occupation suggest that, when these dimensions are controlled in the design, they do not bias the findings. Even if the interaction had reached levels of statistical significance, these data did not fit the hypothesized association between gender and occupation, i.e., that male lawyers and female psychologists would be rated as having the greatest emphasis on rights and responsibilities respectively. The ANOVA analyses point to differences in emphasis on the ethic of care by occupation with females making the primary contribution to the differences found.

Finally, the choice of real life, rather than hypothetical, dilemmas demonstrated that when men and women described situations where they were not sure what was the right thing to do, how they reasoned through the solution was not dependent, as Kohlberg has surmised, on the choice of dilemmas of special obligation to friends and kin. The design of the study precluded real life dilemmas of friends and kin. Typically, the stories we were told centered around conflicts between the demands of their superiors in the agency of firm where they worked.

There is one last set of findings to be reported that are specific to testing for bias in the ratings. Because the sex and professional background of the raters (teachers, speech and communication professors and specialists in the field of moral development) might also have confounded the findings of ratingg differences, a test of these two varibles on the mode of reasoning was run. The ANOVA findings are summarized in tables 3 and 4. The results indicate that neither sex or professional background of the rater resulted in biased distribution of rating scores.

Discussion

This study began with the assumption that the two modes of moral reasoning described by Gilligan existed and could be tested in several ways. The primary focus was on selected methodological issues that have surrounded the development of Gilligan's theory of specific pathways of moral reasoning that differ by sex.

Secondary to this was the generation of findings that might lead to interpretation of their consistency with the hypotheses drawn from the theory. The importance of resolving these methodological problems is indicated by the subsequent findings from this study that cast a new light on earlier work. Whereas our findings indicate that differences do occur in the way that men and women are perceived as thinking about the resolution of moral dilemmas, the methods that we have chosen to use have revealed that the differences are not as hypothesized.

The issue of how analytic inquiry proceeds, and how to make explicit the assumptions that support any given inquiry are at the heart of the research tradition. It is inevitable that scientists are caught in a web of interrelationships between the methods they choose to use and the findings that result. The discussion that follows will center around these issues considering first, the specific design and method choices made in this study and second, the consequent conceptual issues they brought to light.

Methodological Issues. First, the use of real life dilemmas tested one hypothesized explanation of sex-specific stage differences in morla reasoning, but left unanswered many questions one might ask about how hypothetical stories chosen by the investigator differ as a stimulus from self-selected personal stories elicited from the subjects. The advantages of hypothetical stories may be that they permit greater analysis of how individuals reason while personal stories may be so closely linked to moral action that the reasoning process is made less explicit. The advantage of real life stories lies in their congruency with the experience

of the story-teller, however, and the potential these stories have for underlining the personal view of what constitutes a moral problem and how one explains the reasoning process.

Second, the decision to use two separate scales to measure the use of specific modes of reasoning produced findings about male-female differences that are inconsistent with earlier reports. Since over forty percent of the subjects were rated as having equivalent amounts of both modes of reasoning, the hypothesis of sex-specific pathways is weakened. Both males and females would have to have significantly different mean scores on both scales in the direction hypothesized to support the sex-specific aspect of the theory. Further, we do not know whether the inclusion of a "placebo" mode (a third scale) would have led raters to percieve some emphasis of that "mode" as well. Finally, because we have no information about level of development, we cannot speculate on whether those ratings that do differentiate individuals by sex might be confounded by (unmeasured) developmental level.

The selection of subjects matched for education, age and occupation was deliberate. The findings suggest that when these variables are controlled, differences in use of the "ethic of care" were still evident. Whether or not these differences would persist in the face of developmental level attributions or other unmeasured characteristics is unknown. More thoughtful selection of subjects for studies in this field will help to tease apart idiosyncratic characteristics that influence findings randomly from factors that represent systematic bias of interest.

Conceptual Issues. Understanding the findings in the context of a theory that posits two sex-specific modes of moral reasoning has led to a discussion that first addressed specific methodological issues, and now moves on to the intriguing questions that surround the conceptual bais of the theory. The focus must shift to a discussion of the research question reframed more broadly to include the possible reasons for the inconsistent with earlier work. Briefly stated, do these findings reflect

a) conceptual inconsistencies in the theory, b) methodological artifacts, or c) inadequate methods of inquiry?

Conceptual Inconsistencies. If we begin by accepting the conceptual assumptions of the theory, then one might argue that the concept of two different but parallel pathways to moral development is not supported if men in this sample are just as likely to emphasize care as justice in their reasonings. On the other hand, if women, in this sample, are placing much more emphasis on care and much less emphasis on justice that the men, then one might argue that men and women differ in this respect and the argument must shift to why those differences exist. These arguments assume conceptual soundness of the theory of sex-specific differences in moral development and interpret the findings within that conceptual framework.

Methodological Artifacts. A different way of thinking about the findings is to explore the likelihood that the results are nothing more than methodological artifacts. Is it possible that the methods used obscure important information relevant to the research question posed? If one considers just why men use equal emphasis on both care and justice and women demonstrate an equal emphasis, one answer may be that the ethic of care, labeled by Gilligan a mode of moral reasoning is, perhaps, characteristic of personality and culture, rather than a corollary of justice reasoning. This is an argument based on the potential for methodological artifacts to mask unsupported assumptions about the nature of the inquiry. In this instance, the study has assumed parity in the "ethic of care" and the "ethic of justice". The study design placed the raters in the position of accepting the notion of two equal but different modes of reasoning in order to complete the stated task of "rating" the interviews. Because raters perceived that women placed a lot of emphasis in their stories about responsibilities within interpersonal networks, they used the scale given to them to report that emphasis. The analysis assumes that the scale score is the functional equivalent of how they reason about moral issues.

Inadequate Methods of Inquiry. The third framework within which these data might be considered is that of inadequate methods of inquiry. Our data support some differences between man and women, but not in the direction hypothesized. If only men had been used in this sample, we would have found no differences at all between the two hypothesized modes. Both care and justice appeared to be equally emphasized by the male subjects. There is no evidence here that men do mot take into their consideration the relational aspects of moral dilemmas, nor are issues of connectedness and care ignored. Why the raters in this study percieved these men to emphasize those aspects of moral reasoning that heretofore have been reported as the domain of females is unclear. It may be a function of inadequate study design: raters were forced to choose between two modes of reasoning, and hearing two "voices", recorded both. A number of quite different approaches to capturing style of moral reasoning might well have been applied with quite different results than those reported here. Aspects of culture and sex-roles were not explored ar all in this study. Perhaps, changes in sex-role socialization in out culture have made young men more attentive to relationships and that has increased the extent to which they weave this notion into their stories. Only studies of far greater sophistication and power will need to be designed to fully capture the nuances embedded in questions of how individuals reason about moral dilemmas.

Summary

The women in this study were seen as placing far more emphasis on an ethic of care rather than of justice. This finding, in isolation without additional information, might lead to the conclusion that this is evidence that women do indeed use a different mode of reasoning. Using the scores from two scales in a multivariate analysis teased apart potentially confounding factors that have been reported in earlier work using less robust statistical techniques.

Comparing the pattern of male mean scores with the pattern of female mean scores, we cannot conclude, that because differences exist in mean scores among the women subjects, as hypothesized, that Gilligan's theory has been supported by these data. To conclude otherwise we would have to be prepared to make several assumptions: first, that asymmetrical patterns characterize the moral reasoning of men and women and second, that sufficient evidence has been put forth to support the theory of two pathways of moral reasoning specific to men and women.

The first assumption cannot be dismissed out of hand without further research, but we cannot add to that discussion intelligently within the scope of this paper. The second assumption, that of establishing a nomological net of constructs to support the "ethic of care" as the framework for moral reasoning among women, can be explored a bit further.

What defines a developmental process of reasoning and how does that definition differ from other cognitive characteristics or culturally determined attitudes and beliefs? Neither this study or earlier studies have provided rigorous examination of the cognitive-developmental aspects of the ethic of care within Gilligan's theory. The data from this study are inadequate to explore how gender and culture might account for our findings but the work of others in the field or sex-roles and gender may provide a fruitful avenue for research related to the different patterns found in this study.

It is possible that the two hypothesized styles are not parallel modes of reasoning but that one or both are different expressions of some culturally-shaped characteristic that exhibits itself in non-symmetrical ways. How else are we to understand that women differ not just in how they construct their framwork for moral reasoning, but also in the patterns of their responses that are different from the pattern of men?

It may be that, rather than two modes of moral reason, there may be only one, that of the ethic of justice, and the aspects of care and responsibility emphasized by the women subjects may be gender-specific and the consequence of strong socially accepted sex-role attributes. Gilligan (1982) herself points to gender differences (rather than sex) as an explanation.

That women speak in a different voice, and as a consequence, are often not heard in our male dominated society, is a phenomenon understood by most women, and one that is increasingly well documented in the literature. Further exploration and research is needed to increase our understanding of this phenomenon, and thus enhance our understanding of how communication is affected by gender and affects communication between women and men.

Gilligan's compelling description of what it means to women not to be heard has struck a resonant chord. But whether or not women, in this culture, express their rationale for their moral action within a framework of care and responsibility remains a question.

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TABLE 1 AND 2

Comparison of Moral Reasoning Style by Respondent Sex and Occupation

	Degrees of Freedom	Mean Square	F-ratio	Prob
Ethic of Care				
Sex	1	1.01	9.22	.008
Occupation	1	.24	2.15	.162
Interaction	1	.31	2.83	.112
Error	16	.12		
Ethic of Justice				
Sex	1	.42	1.83	.195
Occupation	1	.01	.04	.853
Interaction	1	.29	1.23	.283
Error	16	.23		

TABLE 3 AND 4

Comparison of Ratings by Rater Sex and Occupation

	Degrees Freedom	Mean Square	F-Ratio	Prob
Ethic of Care				
Occupation	2	.84	.81	.448
Sex	1	.02	.02	.901
Interaction	2	3.63	3.49	.032
Error	234	1.04		
Ethic of Justice				
Occupation	2	2.58	2.24	.109
Sex	1	.04	.03	.859
Interaction	2	.71	.62	.540
Error	234	1.15		